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THE O'MAHONEY-MILLIKEN AMENDMENTS: THE WEST
SINKS THE NAVIGATION POWER*
GENE OLSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1988 brought images of drought: dry fields and
thirsty cattle on the northern plains; barges stuck in the mud of
the lower Mississippi River. These images also illustrate the differ-
ent uses dominating in the basins of the Missouri River: in the
Upper Basin, beneficial consumptive uses in agriculture and indus-
try are stressed; in the Lower Basin navigation and flood control
are the concerns.' Two actions appeared on the United States
Supreme Court's 1987-88 docket2 involving skirmishes in a con-
frontation between the haves and have-nots of the Missouri River
Basin, between the Lower Basin's systems of navigation and the
Upper Basin's struggle to develop its consumptive uses. However,
the Court did not decide which use of Missouri River water had
priority in the federal system of water regulation, but rather dis-
posed of the controversies on collateral issues.
A. ETSI PIPELINE PROJECT V. MISSOURI
In ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri,3 the Court interpreted
* Copyright Gene Olson, 1989.
** Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law; LL.M.
Candidate, University of Arkansas; J.D., B.S.Ed., B.A., University of North Dakota.
The author acknowledges the assistance and guidance of Donald D. MacIntyre, Chief
Legal Counsel, Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation in the
preparation of this article.
1. Justice White in ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805, 808 (1988)
described the Missouri Basin as follows:
The Missouri River Basin is a watershed that covers a vast area in the
midwestern United States. The topography of this area, however, reveals two
distinct regions that experience very different water problems. The upper part
of the Basin, which includes large sections of Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota,
and South Dakota, is mostly arid or semi-arid; there, the Missouri River and its
tributaries are important because they represent a major resource for
developing the agricultural and industrial potential of the area. The lower part
of the Basin, which includes territory in Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri, is
more humid, and there the rivers are used chiefly for navigation, though the
critical problem in this region is to control flooding. See generally M. Ridgeway,
The Missouri Basin's Pick-Sloan Plan 47-55 (1955). In the early 1940s, Congress
focused its attention on the water problems of the Missouri River Basin,
prompted especially by severe floods that had devastated the Lower Basin in
1943 and 1944.
Id.
2. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805 (1988); South Dakota v. Nebraska,
108 S. Ct. 1071 (1988).
3. 108 S. Ct. 805 (1988).
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provisions of the Flood Control Act of 1944 regulating water con-
tracts for industrial, 4 reclamation and power 5 uses; and the Recla-
mation Project Act of 1939 regulating water contracts for
municipal and miscellaneous uses.6
At issue was whether the Secretary of the Interior had author-
ity to contract with private parties for the distribution of Missouri
River water for industrial purposes.7 The skirmish in ETSI
involved a company (ETSI) which needed water from the Lake
Oahe reservoir to mix with pulverized coal to form a slurry which
could then be piped to a power plant.' The opposing parties were
the Lower Basin States of Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska, which did
not want the Missouri River depleted and their navigation systems
threatened by Upper Basin consumptive uses.9 South Dakota
granted ETSI a water use permit under state law.' ° In addition,
ETSI had contracted with the Interior Secretary, who believed he
had authority to do so under the Flood Control Act of 1944 and
the Reclamation Project Act of 1939.11
Rather than seek a ruling as to which uses, navigation or con-
sumptive, had priority, the Lower Basin States attacked the valid-
ity of the federal contract.' 2 Specifically, the Lower Basin States
contended that the Interior Secretary lacked authority under the
Flood Control Act of 1944 to contract for the distribution of water
for industrial uses without the approval of the Secretary of
Defense, the head of the Army Corps of Engineers.13 The United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
Oahe reservoir on the Missouri River had been built by the Army
Corps of Engineers and that its dominant function was flood con-
trol and navigation.14 The lower federal courts both held that
4. E7SI, 108 S. Ct. at 810-11; Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 6, 58 Stat. 887, 890-91 (reprinted in
1944 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 887, 891; codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 708 (1982)).
5. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 9(c), 58 Stat. 887, 891 (1944).
6. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1982).
7. ETSJ, 108 S. Ct. at 807.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 807, 809.
10. Id. at 807.
11. Id. at 816-17. Once an irrigation project is established by the Bureau of
Reclamation on a reservoir, the Interior Secretary has the authority under federal
reclamation laws to "reallocate irrigation water from irrigation projects to other purposes
when he sees fit, as long as 'it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation
purposes.' Id. at 813 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1946)).
12. Id. at 807-08.
13. ld.
14. Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268, 1273-79 (D. Neb. 1984), af'd, 787 F.2d
270, 287 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Defense, as head of the Army Corps of
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Oahe was neither built as a reclamation project nor used for irriga-
tion, and, therefore, the Secretary of the Interior could not unilat-
erally contract for the delivery of water for industrial purposes.
15
Since the Oahe dam was built as a flood control project, the Secre-
tary of Defense was a necessary party to any contract for industrial
water use from the reservoir.' 6 The Supreme Court affirmed, find-
ing nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history
which mandated a contrary result.17 ETSI Pipeline Project illus-
trates a classic trial strategy; if you beat them on procedure you
never have to deal with substance.'" The underlying controversy
left unresolved was the identification of the dominant use of Mis-
souri River water: consumptive or non-consumptive. Resolution of
that question will depend in large part on the effect given the
O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendments to the Flood Control Act,'" and
its companion legislation, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945.20
B. SOUTH DAKOTA V. NEBRASKA
The State of South Dakota has urged the United States
Supreme Court to determine the legal priority between consump-
tive and non-consumptive uses in an original action against
Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri.21 Originally filed in 1985, South
Engineers, has primary authority over construction and operation of water projects under
the Flood Control Act of 1944. ETSI, 109 S. Ct. at 811, 816. Historically, the main
objectives of the Army Corps of Engineers has been flood control and navigation. See
Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir. 1986Xsame caseXinterest of Army Corps of
Engineers primarily in flood control and navigation). The Court indicated that the Interior
Secretary, as head of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, has
secondary authority over construction and operation of the projects under the Flood
Control Act of 1944 and the Reclamation Project Act of 1939. ETSI, 108 S. Ct. at 811.
Historically, the main objectives of the Bureau of Reclamation Interior Department have
been the reclamation of arid Western land through irrigation. Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.
2d at 275. Thus, there exists a potential for conflict within the federal bureaucracy which
parallels the tension between the Upper and Lower Basins. See N. HUNDLEY, WATER AND
THE WEST 327-28 (1975). In his discussion of the development of greater federal authority
over allocations of water, the author stated:
The federal government may indeed operate more efficiently and fairly than the
states; but to do so, it will have to avoid bureaucratic conflicts like those between
the Army Corps of Engineers and the Reclamation Bureau that for years held up
the development of the Missouri River.
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. at 1277-78, affd, 787 F.2d at 287.
16. Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d at 281.
17. ETSI, 108 S. Ct. at 816.
18. See ETSJ, 108 S. Ct. at 817 (holding that Interior Secretary had no authority to
contract water for industrial use). The Court did not reach the underlying dispute between
Upper Basin irrigation interests and the Lower Basin navigation interests. Id.
19. 90 Cong. Rec. 8546 (1944); Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-09 (1982). For the
text of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, see text supporting footnote 202.
20. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945, 33 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 603(a) (1982).
21. South Dakota v. Nebraska, Original No. 103 (U.S. filed Aug. 16, 1985); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1982Xoriginal jurisdiction); Sup. CT. R. 9 (1983Xmotion for leave to file). The South
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Dakota's Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint has been
denied twice by the Court, first in 198622 and again in the 1987-88
term.23 Though the orders denying the motion have cited no rea-
son,24 it is likely that the Court found no actual injury to South
Dakota at present, and therefore, no real controversy over Mis-
souri River waters.
For instance, in 1983 the Supreme Court dismissed an
attempt by Idaho to force the states of Washington and Oregon to
improve their fish management practices.2 5 Idaho argued, in an
original action asking for an equitable apportionment of rights
related to anadromous fish in the Columbia-Snake River system, 26
that it could not have harvestable surpluses of fish in the future if
the defendant states' management practices did not change.
The Special Master, and the Court, found that Idaho had not
demonstrated a sufficient injury, finding no proof of current or
likely future disproportionate taking of fish or of current or likely
future mismanagement of the resource.28 Thus, the existence of
an actual injury appears to be a critical prerequisite for a Supreme
Court finding of jurisdiction to resolve a controversy in an original
action between states.
A real controversy in the Missouri River Basin would occur if
the development of industrial or agricultural uses in the Upper
Dakota legislature appropriated a $1 million war chest to seek an equitable apportionment
of that state's right to Missouri River basin. Guhin, South Dakota Report, XVIII Rocky Mtn.
Min. L. Found. Water L. Newsletter, No. 1, 1985, at 7. For a discussion of original
jurisdiction in suits between states, see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4042, 4045 (1988).
22. South Dakota v. Nebraska, 475 U.S. 1093 (1986).
23. South Dakota v. Nebraska, 108 S. Ct. 1071 (1988).
24. The Court's initial order denying leave stated: "The motion for leave to file a bill of
complaint is denied without prejudice." South Dakota v. Nebraska, 475 U.S. at 1093 (1986).
The Court used nearly identical language in denying the renewed motion. South Dakota v.
Nebraska, 108 S. Ct. at 1071. See Idaho ex rel Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1027
(1983Xdismissing an attempt by Idaho to equitably apportion a natural resource, fish, on the
grounds that Idaho did not offer sufficient evidence of present or future harm).
25. Idaho ex rel Evans, 462 U.S. at 1029.
26. The Court specifically recognized the applicability of equitable apportionment to
the dispute over anadromous fish - those species of fish that ascend a river to spawn -
recognizing the similarities between fish and the resource traditionally apportioned
equitably, water. Id. at 1024. The Court noted that water and fish travel through several
states, that overuse by one state diminishes the ability of other states to use the resource,
and that disputes over water in the Columbia-Snake system could be settled through the
application of the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment. Id. at 1024-25.
27. Id. at 1033-34.
28. Id. at 1027-29. The dissent, however, argued that Idaho had been denied its
opportunity to demonstrate a sufficient harm when the Special Master excluded from
consideration evidence of past or possible future management practices relevant to the
existence of any fish run. Id. at 1032. While techniques existed to maximize current
conditions and to improve conditions in the future, Idaho was unable to force Washington
and Oregon to use the techniques save through equitable relief obtained in an original
action. Id. at 1034.
THE O'MAHONEY-MILLIKEN AMENDMENTS
Basin advanced to a level which depleted the water available for
navigation in the Lower Basin.29 Since that level of development
does not exist, there is no present conflict. According to William
Janklow, former Governor of South Dakota, the absence of the
development of consumptive uses is analogous to a chicken-or-the
egg dilemma.30 Janklow points out that consumptive uses cannot
be developed without investment.3 1 Since the federal govern-
ment has ceased developing large water projects, and since pri-
vate interests will not invest unless an assurance is made of
adequate water to support the development, the money is not
available. "The fact of the matter is," says Janklow, "you can't
build hog-slaughtering facilities, agribusiness, and agriculture
processing facilities when you don't have water... .32 The
dilemma is completed by the Supreme Court's apparent unwill-
ingness to make a statement on the relative rights to Missouri
River water until greater levels of use are developed.
In the original action South Dakota argued in part that Con-
gress, in "enacting the Flood Control Act of 1944, chose to limit
the exercise of federal authority over these waters in such a fash-
ion as to honor and affirmatively to declare the traditional rights of
the Upper Basin States to allocate waters within its boundaries.
' 33
That language indicates the Upper Basin States' position: in the
O'Mahoney-Milliken Preference Amendment to the Flood Con-
trol Act of 1944, Congress chose to subordinate the navigation
rights of the federal government to those rights for beneficial con-
sumptive uses established under state law.34 Such an interpreta-
tion is important to the arid Western States because the Flood
Control Act 35 and its companion, the Rivers and Harbors Omnibus
29. Id. at 1027 (determination of whether real or substantial injury exists should be
based on present conditions).
30. See Janklow, High Noon in the Missouri River Basin, Boundaries Carved in Water:
The Missouri River Brief Series 4 (Feb. 1988Xavailable from the Northern Lights Research




33. Motion For Leave To File Complaint at 4, South Dakota v. Nebraska, 106 S. Ct.
1487, Original No. 103 (U.S. filed Aug. 16, 1985).
34. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 1(c), 58 Stat. 887, 889 (codified at
33 U.S.C. § 701-09(a) (1982)). For the text of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Preference
Amendment, see text infra at note 202.
35. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944Xcodified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460(d), 825(s); 33
U.S.C. §§ 701-1, 701(a-l), 701(b)-2, 701(c) note, 708, 709; 43 U.S.C. § 390 (1982)).
The Flood Control Act of .1944 included works in the following Western river basins:
Arkansas, Red Quachita, Missouri, Colorado, Rio Grande, San Diego, Ventura, Santa Ana,
Los Angeles-San Gabriel, Sacramento-San Joaquin, Coquille, Nehalem, Williamette,
Columbia, and Wilapa. 58 Stat. at 885-902.
1989]
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Act of 1945,36 were the starting points for river development in
virtually every Western State. The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amend-
ment refers to "waters arising in states lying wholly or partly west
of the ninety-eighth meridian. '3 7 It is not limited to the Missouri
River.
Finding the effect of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment is
essentially an exercise in statutory construction. Central to the
process will be legislative intent, the finding of which usually
involves answering a classic formula articulated in 1584 by Lord
Coke:
1. What was the state of the law before the making of
the act?
2. What was the defect for which the common law did
not provide?
3. What remedy did the legislature choose to correct the
defect?
4. How is the remedy to be applied?
38
To follow that formula this article will examine: the law of
interstate allocations of water, by compact, 39 equitable apportion-
ment,40 and congressional apportionment;4 1 federal reclamation
law;4 2 and the legislative history of the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendments to the two federal acts. 43 It will then discuss the pos-
sible constructions of the amendments4 4 and add a note on a con-
stitutional issue.4 5
II. INTERSTATE WATER LAW
A. INTERSTATE APPORTIONMENTS
In the western United States water rights are almost exclu-
sively identified according to the doctrine of prior appropriation,
which gives a priority to water users by time.4 The attributes of
36. Rivers and Harbors Omnibus Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-14, 59 Stat. 10 (codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 554(b), 603(a) (1982)).
37. 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-1 (1982); 33 U.S.C.A. § 701(b) (1986).
38. Paraphrasing Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1548) discussed in 2a N. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45-05 (Sands 5th ed. 1984).
39. See infra at notes 51-56.
40. See infra at notes 57-81.
41. See infra at notes 82-97.
42. See infra at notes 127-156.
43. See infra at notes 157-216.
44. See infra at notes 217-239.
45. See infra at notes 240-251.
46. G. GOULD, STATE WATER LAW IN THE WEST 2-4 (1979). Under the prior
appropriate regime, users are referred to as appropriators. A senior appropriator is entitled
to satisfy all of his appropriation before a junior appropriator receives any of his. Each
[Vol. 65:91
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water rights, as well as the rules for identifying, proving, and quan-
appropriator's priority is fixed at the time of his first diversion of water for beneficial
consumptive use. Should he enlarge his use at a later date, the new use will constitute a
new appropriations with a junior's priority. See generally 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
LAW § 710[3] (1988 rev. ed.). For a discussion of water law in the Missouri River Basin
States, see 3 MISSOURI RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN COMPREHENSIVE
FRAME-STUDY 1 (1978Xlaws, policy, and administration). The introduction provides a
summary as follows:
The development and use of water resources long has been recognized as a
responsibility of both the States and the Federal Government in the Missouri
Basin, as in the Nation. Their resource objectives and programs are largely
complementary, as are their water laws and policies, though there are some
areas of uncertainty and challenge. The laws have evolved gradually, stemming
initially from the State and Federal constitutions, then from statutory action, and
from many judicial decisions. Many of the national laws stemmed from pressing
issues in the Missouri Basin and the West generally. From all of these have come
important elements of State and Federal policy, and particularly at the State
level, the practical means for water administration. Variations in climate, water
availability, and water uses gave rise early to some differences in water law and
policy among the States of the basin, although there are many similarities.
For parts of the Nation, early use of the water resources for navigation and
later for mining resulted in legislation in these fields. Particularly after the Civil
War, attention in the arid west and Missouri River Basin increasingly was
focused on the development and use of water resources. This gave rise to
legislation and suitable programs, and to mounting water usage for economic
development in the form of mining and mineral processing, irrigated
agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, and - with the economic growth
- increased uses for rural and urban domestic and industrial purposes. More
recently, public interest together with legislative and development action
programs have resulted in increased attention to matters of restoring and
sustaining water quality, and for water to sustain and enhance recreation, fish,
and wildlife, and the general environment.
In the general field of water law in the basin, two fundamental but opposing
doctrines are found. The common-law doctrine of riparian rights is based on
ownership of lands contiguous to a stream without regard to the uses, if any, to
which the water is put, and with no concern for time of such uses. On the other
hand, the doctrine of prior appropriation disregards the ownership of riparian
lands. Rather, this doctrine is concerned with the uses to which water is put, the
time at which such uses first were undertaken, and the diligence with which
water utilization has continued.
Under the riparian rights doctrine, the owner of land contiguous to a natural
stream or natural lake may use the waters for such purposes and in such
quantities as he chooses, so long as his use does not appreciably diminish the flow
or impair the quality of water for downstream uses. The riparian owners right is
the same as all others on that stream. Thus, his right is not acquired by actual use
of the water and is not lost by failure to use it.
Under the appropriation rights doctrine, the beneficial use of water is the
basis, the measure, and the limit of the water right. Therefore, the first
beneficial appropriation in time is prior in right. A right is perfected only by
actual use and is subject to loss if the use is discontinued or abandoned.
Appropriated water may be used either on lands contiguous to a stream or on
lands or for other purposes at some distance removed.
In the Missouri Basin two states, Minnesota and Missouri, continue to
recognize primarily the riparian doctrine, while Colorado, Montana, and
Wyoming have specifically repudiated it and have established the doctrine of
appropriations rights. The Iowa water rights law makes substantially all uses of
water in the state subject to permit and administrative regulation as to diversion,
storage, or withdrawal over some period of time not to exceed 10 years. The
states of Kansas, Nebraska, and North and South Dakota depend on the
appropriation rights doctrine, but recognize the riparian doctrine in varying
degrees in relation to the statutory rights. In these four states a riparian
landowner could claim a water right to the extent of his reasonable use, but all
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tifying the rights, are established by state law.47 River systems that
flow through and drain multi-state regions are common in the
West, and create a need to apportion the flow between states shar-
ing rivers. Three methods exist for apportioning water between
states: compacts between the states;4 equitable apportionment
by judicial decree; 49 and, congressional apportionment.50
waters in excess thereof remained subject to appropriation. However, Kansas
passed legislation in 1945 and North and South Dakota in 1955 which provided
that thereafter riparian landowners were to be governed by the same laws and
would be obliged to follow the same appropriation procedures as non-riparian
landowners. This legislation did not apply to landowners who were exercising or
developing their riparian water rights at the time the legislation was enacted. It
is significant that in the two exclusively riparian states, and the one water-permit
state, precipitation is reasonably heavy and surface water supplies still are
relatively plentiful. By contrast, in substantial portions of the other seven states
precipitation is relatively light, and the supplies of surface water are
comparatively limited. Under such natural conditions and high potential water
usage, the reliance of these seven states, in whole or in part, on the appropriation
doctrine is understandable. Clearly the irrigation of vast areas of land and many
other industrial developments, some removed many miles from existing natural
streams, would have been difficult if not impracticable under the common-law
riparian doctrine.
Id. at 1-2. See also ACQUIRING WATER FOR ENERGY: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 30-37 (G.
Weatherford ed. 1982Xincluding map of surface water rights systems in the United
States)[hereinafter ACQUIRING WATER FOR ENERGY].
47. ACQUIRING WATER FOR ENERGY, supra note 46, at 38. Although state law usually
controls the use of water, interstate compacts, decisions of the Supreme Court, Congress,
and Federal agencies may also exert a great deal of control over the use of water. Id. at 39.
The federal government's authority over water allocation and use is derived from its war,
commerce, navigation, general welfare, property, and treaty powers. Id. For a discussion of
federal power to control water resources, see infra notes 82-216.
For a discussion of the relationship between state and federal water law, see D.
MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS 15-20 (1987). See also B. ANDRESS & M. SNASONE,
WHO RUNS THE RIVERS, DAMS AND DECISIONS IN THE NEW WEST? 315-16 (1983). The
authors describe Congress' attempt to divide power over water between the states and the
federal government:
When Congress passed the Reclamation Act in 1902, a major issue of debate
was how the federal government and the states would share the power under
the new reclamation program. As a compromise measure to accommodate the
interests of the two levels of government, Congress enacted Section 8. This
provision declared that
[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to
the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or
any vested rights acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in
carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such
laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or the
Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in,
to or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, that the
right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be
appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right.
Id. (citing the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 which is codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 372, 383 (1982)Xfootnotes, omitted).
48. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
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1. Compacts
The United States Constitution places conditions on the
power of states to make agreements with other sovereigns in the
Compact Clause: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress
... enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or
with a foreign Power .. " thus making Congress a necessary
party to the compacting process. States have used compacts to
negotiate settlements of interstate river disputes, the first being
the Colorado River Compact between Arizona, California, Colo-
rado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 2 Negotiations
typically take place 'in three stages: (1) an Act of Congress autho-
rizes the negotiations, and often appoints a federal representative
to the process; (2) negotiations are held between the representa-
tives of the participating states culminating in the drafting of the
actual compact; and (3) Congress consents to and approves the
negotiated compact. 3 The Supreme Court has stated that this
method is preferable to litigation. 4 Furthermore, the availability
of a judicial remedy, with the attendant expense and uncertainty
of protracted litigation, provides an incentive for negotiating a
compact.55 Advantages to the compact method include providing
51. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 10, cl. 3.
52. The Colorado River Compact can be found at 70 CONG. REC. 324-25 (1928), and
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF INTERIOR, DOCUMENTS ON THE USE AND CONTROL OF THE
WATERS OF INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL STREAMS 39 (1957). This was the first water
apportionment compact negotiated by the states. It was not, however, the first consented
to by the Congress. That distinction went to the La Plata River Compact. La Plata River
Compact, 43 Stat. 796 (1925); 3 W. HUTCHINS, WATERS RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 87-88 n. 69 (1977).
53. C. Corker, Water Rights in Interstate Streams, in 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER AND ALLIED PROBLEMS § 133.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967)
[hereinafter WATER AND WATER RIGHTS]. For a recent discussion on the use of compacts
see, Grant, The Future of Interstate Allocations of Water, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 977
(1984).
54. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943). Justice Roberts, writing for the Court,
said:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of states in such
cases is that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the
interests of quasi-sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and,
due to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert
administration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such
controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and agreement,
pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal constitution. We say ... that such
mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of
settlement, instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. Mr. Justice Baldwin observed in 1838 that the availability of a judicial remedy
might be an essential element in making the compact process work:
Bound hand and foot by the prohibitions of the constitution, a complaining state
can neither treat, agree, nor fight with its adversary, without the consent of
congress; a resort to the judicial power is the only means left for legally adjusting,
or persuading a state which has possession of disputed territory, to enter into an
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for the administration and amendment of the compact and reser-
vations of water from appropriation.5 6
2. Equitable Apportionment
The Supreme Court has been called upon repeatedly to apply
the theory of equitable apportionment in lawsuits between
states. 7 Equitable apportionment represents a federal common
law. It does not rest on any statutory or constitutional standard
aside from the question of original jurisdiction, and is judge-made
law created by the Supreme Court acting on general equitable
principals in resolving a dispute between states.58 In seven of
these actions the Court declined to make an apportionment, bas-
ing its disposition on various findings, including: that the state
diverting water was within its rights,5 9 that a necessary party was
absent, 60 that the state seeking the order was unable to prove the
damage alleged as a basis for an equitable order,6" or that it
couldn't prove that the conservation measures called for would
yield savings equal to the requested diversion.62
The Supreme Court has twice made equitable apportion-
ments based on the principle of prior appropriation applied to
interstate waters.6 While the Court has not articulated a definite
standard for equitable apportionment, the allocations it has made
have used the precepts of prior appropriation as the central guide-
lines of its decisions: priority of time, judged from first beneficial
agreement or compact, relating to a controverted boundary. Few, if any, will be
made, when it is left to the pleasure of the state in possession; but when it is
known that some tribunal can decide on the right, it is most probable that
controversies will be settled by compact.
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838).
56. Under the prior appropriation system, appropriations cannot normally be made for
future use. 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER AND
ALLIED PROBLEMS § 408.1, p. 70-71 (R. Clark ed. 1967Xwater has to be applied within a
reasonable time for an appropriation to be perfected). In a compact, states can reserve
water for planned projects long before the future users of the water are identified. 2
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 53, § 133.3, at 363. This provides the stability
needed to justify the massive investment represented by reclamation projects.
57. See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Evans, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S.. 46 (1907).
58. See generally Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated,
and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 381, 388-402 (1985).
59. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383
(1943); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
60. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936Xabsence of United States would prevent
full finding of facts).
61. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
62. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
63. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419
(1922).
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use, with the extent of the priority quantified by the actual use of
the right.64 The cases involved suits between states initiated when
new upstream projects were started on fully or over-appropriated
rivers.65
In Nebraska v. Wyoming 6 6 a special master was appointed to
conduct a trial, a report was made, and an opinion and decree
issued following the.taking of exception from the report by one or
more of the involved states, 67 while in Wyoming v. Colorado 68 the
evidence was taken by the Court, with some participation by a
representative of the United States.69
In making an equitable apportionment the Court has tested
and determined the rights of the states solely by application of
general principles of prior appropriation without regard for state
boundaries.7 0  In Wyoming v. Colorado, the Court ordered what
was later characterized as a mass allocation 7 1 between the two
states representing their citizens as parens patriae,2 leaving the
intrastate allocations to be made according to state law.73 The
decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming, however, made both a mass allo-
cation to Colorado (actually a recognition of a certain allowable
level of use)74 and a percentage allocation of the natural flow of
canals and reservoirs in Wyoming between users in Wyoming and
Nebraska.75 In the later case, the Colorado uses were affirmed
even though some were out of priority.76 The Court considered
factors of estoppel, based on the established economy in some Col-
orado basins which was developed without protest by downstream
users,77 and the effects of flowage time and evaporation, acknowl-
64. See MISSOURI RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, supra note 46, at 2.
65. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922), Wyoming brought an original
jurisdiction action against Colorado and two Colorado corporations to prevent diversion for
the Laramie-Poudre project. That project sought to divert water from the Laramie River,
through a tunnel and into the Poudre watershed, which is not part of the Laramie River
system. Id. at 455, 490-91. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) involved both local
irrigation projects and federal reclamation projects on the North Platte River, specifically
the North Platte and Kendrick Projects. Id. at 595-99. As original actions tried to the
United States Supreme Court, equitable apportionment cases between the various states
require the presentation of evidence. See U.S. Const., art, III, § 2.
66. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
67. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 591.
68. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
69. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 456 (1922).
70. Id. at 495-96.
71. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 627.
72. Id. at 616.
73. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 470, modified, 260 U.S. 1 (1922).
74. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618.
75. Id. at 645-46.
76. Id. at 622.
77. Id. at 621.
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edging a general rule that junior appropriators are not ordered to
cease their use of water when little or no benefit will be realized
by the senior appropriator. 78  Thus the Nebraska v. Wyoming
decree was not made strictly on the basis of priority of time, but
made equitable adjustments according to rules consistent with the
doctrine of prior appropriation.79
In arriving at its decreed apportionment in Nebraska v. Wyo-
ming, the Court considered all factors creating equities in favor of
one state and against another, including the establishment of a
local economy based on uses which were left unchallenged for a
considerable period. 0 The Court adopted a flat rate allocation,
chosen because it approximated rights granted by prior appropria-
tion, while accounting for early uses, return flows, the relative stor-
age water rights of parties, and hydrological factors.8 '
3. Congressional Apportionment
The idea that Congress might act to apportion interstate
waters by statute was first stated and applied in Arizona v. Califor-
nia. 2 The Supreme Court found that Congress provided a
78. Id. at 619.
79. Prior appropriation jurisdictions do not allow an absolute right in a senior
appropriator to have the water pass a junior's headgate when that water will not reach the
senior's diversion point. Id. See Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, -,
94 P. 339, 342 (1908Xplaintiff's complaint for upholding its senior appropriation failed to
state facts showing that volume diverted is not lost by plaintiff's diversion methods).
Prior appropriation also recognizes laches or abandonment as factors affecting priority
by time of use. For example, in Washington v. Oregon, the state of Washington brought an
action contending that the state of Oregon was wrongfully diverting the waters of the Walla
Walla River to the prejudice of inhabitants of Washington. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S.
517, 518 (1936). By a Washington court decree, the Gardena Farms District was adjudged
the holder of a water right in the river with an 1892 priority. Id. at 521. No significant
diversion was made to the district until 1904. Id. Beginning in approximately 1880,
irrigators in Oregon had been appropriating some water from the River. Id. at 522. Thus,
Oregon contended that the Gardena Farms district's priority was lost due to laches. Id. at
527.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Gardena District abandoned its
priority. Id. at 528. The Court stated the "[a] priority once acquired... may be lost to the
claimant by abandonment or laches." Id. at 527. The Court stated that Gardena Farms
demonstrated by many acts its recognition of the Oregon irrigators' appropriations. Id. at
528. This "recognition" coupled with the failure of Gardena Farms District to put the
water to beneficial use within a reasonable period of time lead the Court to hold that
Gardena Farms' priority was abandoned. Id. at 528. Thus Washington's action against the
irrigators for wrongful diversion was dismissed. Id. at 530.
80. 325 U.S. at 621.
81. Id. at 645-46. The Court applied the fiat percentage system recommended by the
Special Master. Id. at 646. The Special Master proposed the fiat percentage method for the
Whalen to Tri-State Dam portion of the North Platte River. Id. at 637-38. This method
apportioned the natural flow water in that section based on the following percentages: 25%
to Wyoming and 75% to Nebraska. Id. at 638. Nebraska, however, was given some priority
because Nebraska had the right to designate from time to time the portion of its share
which would be diverted. Id. During this time Wyoming was enjoined from diversions
contrary to Nebraska's apportionment. Id.
82. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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method for allocating water to California, Arizona, and Nevada
the water due them under the Colorado River Compact.8 3 After
negotiation between the seven states encompassed in the Colo-
rado River system failed to make a comprehensive division of the
water, a division was made between the Upper and Lower Basins,
and each basin was left to make the intrabasin division by some
other method.8 4 When the failure of the three Lower Basin States
to agree on an allocation threatened to stall the Boulder Canyon
Project, Congress made a division of the water.8 5
Apparently no one understood what Congress had done in
1928, for in 1952 Arizona filed an action against California, seeking
to "quiet title" to its share of the water.8 6 In her complaint Ari-
zona pled the Compact and equitable apportionment as the basis
of her right and the Court's jurisdiction.87 In his report Special
Master Simon H. Rifkind discussed the allocation made by the
Boulder Canyon Project Act, and his recommendations were
adopted by the Court.88
The authority of Congress to make an apportionment of inter-
state water is based in its plenary power under the commerce
clause to manage navigable streams, and in its spending power.8 9
Congressional power to regulate commerce includes transpor-
tation generally, and navigation of rivers specifically.9 ° This power
to control navigable waters was initially found to include the abil-
ity to improve navigation, but has been held to include the power
to destroy navigation to protect adjacent lands from flood,91 and to
obstruct navigation in order to generate electrical power.9 2 From
83. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1963). The compact can be found at 70
CONG. REc. 324-25 (1928).
84. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 557.
85. Id. at 559-61; Act of December 21, 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057, ch. 42
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1982)).
86. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 550-51.
87. See id. at 551 (basic controversy was over how much Colorado River water each
state had legal right to use).
88. Report of Special Master at 551, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
89. For the discussion of Arizona v. California and the possible constitutional sources of
congressional apportionment power, see Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of
Water to People, States, and Nation, 1963 SUPREME COURT REV. 158; and Meyers, The
Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
90. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) ("commerce" contemplates
all of commercial intercourse, not merely the actions of individuals conducting business).
91. Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 528-29 (1941Xmulti-purpose dam
including flood control, navigation, and hydropower features was valid exercise of
commerce clause power even though greater acreage would be flooded than in pure flood
control project).
92. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 329-30 (1936) (construction of high dam for
electrical generation had navigation components even though "improved" condition not
adequate for commercial navigation).
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an initial authority to prevent diversions or obstructions was found
the power to license diversions or obstructions even at the expense
of navigation, and this also applies to the allocation of the water in
the rivers or impounded behind the obstructions.
Congress also has the power to build massive reclamation or
flood control projects to improve and protect the public welfare.93
When water comes under the control of a congressional project,
Congress may exercise dominion, including making
apportionments.
In Arizona v. California the question presented was not
whether Congress had the power to make an apportionment in
one of its acts, but rather whether it had exercised the power in
the Boulder Canyon Project Act.9 4 A majority of the Court agreed
with the Special Master and found Congress had made an appor-
tionment when it conditioned the building of Boulder (now Hoo-
ver) Dam upon ratification by all seven states of the Colorado
River Compact, or California's accepting a limit on her share of 4.4
million acre feet per year of the 7.5 million apportioned to the
Lower Basin in the Compact. 95 Congress also authorized the Sec-
retary of the Interior to contract for the storage of water and to
deliver the water anywhere on the river. 6 No one was to have
stored water in the project save by contract with the Secretary.97
It is significant that this congressional apportionment went unno-
ticed from 1928 until at least the late 1950's, when the.Special
Master held hearings in Arizona v. California. Nevertheless, the
validity of the apportionment was not doubted. It is possible that
other, as yet unnoticed, apportionments have been made through
congressional action.
B. NAVIGATION POWER AND SERVITUDE
Since Gibbons v. Ogden 98 Congress has asserted control over
navigation as a method of interstate transportation, basing its con-
trol in its express power to regulate interstate commerce. 99 Over
93. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950Xthe power of
Congress to promote general welfare through reclamation and other internal
improvements is as clear as power to accomplish these ends indirectly through navigation
power).
94. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-65 (1963) (where Congress has
provided its own method for allocating water, courts have no power to substitute their own
notions of equitable apportionment).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 565.
97. Id.
98. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
99. See, e.g., 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 53, § 101.2(A), at 9.
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time the Supreme Court has extended this navigation power to
the highest reaches of interstate systems. Congressional power
attaches to interstate waters, up to the high water mark.'00 Land
affected by interstate water is said to be servient to the dominant
federal interest.10' This "navigation servitude" is the basis for a
rule of no compensation for injuries suffered by private owners as
a consequence.of congressional uses of the navigation power.'
0 2
Of real concern to riparian land owners in the West is con-
gressional power over navigable streams granted under the Com-
merce Clause. Control under this clause extends to all streams
that once were, are now, or could be used in the future for naviga-
tion, as well as non-navigable tributaries which affect navigable
streams. 10 3 This power to aid (and by logical extension, restrict)
navigation includes the power to control the water for flood con-
trol, power generation, and other objects in addition to naviga-
tion.'0 4 Congressional declarations that a project serves navigation
are not likely to be doubted by the Court.'
0 5
This power extends to any acts that might obstruct the naviga-
ble capacity of waters under congressional control. 10 6 When Con-
gress prohibited any unconsented obstruction of navigable
waters, 10 7 the Court found that "anything, wherever done or how-
ever done... which tends to destroy the navigable capacity of one
of the navigable waters of the United States, is within the terms of
the prohibition.' 0 8 To enforce this prohibition the United States
may enjoin any act which will interfere with navigation. 10 9
A companion to the general navigation power is the naviga-
tion servitude introduced in Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States."10 The "navigation servitude" is a shorthand
expression for the rule that certain private property rights may be
taken in the exercise of the navigation power without compensa-
100. Id. § 101.3(C), at 26.
101. Id. § 101.3(A), at 17.
102. Id. § 101.3(A), at 16.
103. This power is developed and expressed through a progression of cases: Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1924); The Cotton Plant, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 577 (1870); United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co.,
313 U.S. 508 (1941); and, United States v. Grand Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1963).
104. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (1963).
105. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956).
106. United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 707
(1899Xciting statute which prohibits any obstruction to the navigable capacity of waterways
not authorized by law).
107. Id. Act of 1890, ch. 907, § 19, 26 Stat. 426, 454 (1890) (creation of any obstructions
to navigable capacity of waterways, not authorized by law, is prohibited).
108. Id. at 708.
109. Id. at 709.
110. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
19891 105
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
tion."' The navigation power creates federal rights in the lands
subject to the power. Private property rights subject to the power
are therefore not "taken" by the federal action; their impairment
or destruction is the function of the character of the property
rights, not the function of government appropriation of private
rights. Of consequence is the answer to the question, "are state-
granted consumptive water rights among those property rights
that may be taken without compensation?" The answer is proba-
bly yes.
In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co." 2 the Solicitor
General raised the navigation servitude as a defense to claims for
compensation for the loss of water rights through development of
the Central Valley Project in California.1 13 The Majority assumed,
and Justice Douglas in a separate opinion said, that the plaintiffs
had no constitutional right to compensation; i.e., Congress could
take these water rights in furtherance of the navigation power.1 14
Instead, the Court found a congressional intent, in the Act's appro-
priation of funds, and in the Bureau of Reclamation's practice in
implementing the statutory plan, to compensate landowners for
vested water rights lost through the project. 115 Compensation was
thus a function of congressional choice, not of takings
jurisprudence.
Authority for a rule of no compensation for loss of impaired
state water rights is based in these propositions: private ownership
of a navigable river is impossible; and, the ownership of riparian
lands is servient to congressional power to use and control the
water. Private ownership of navigable rivers is impossible.' 16
Ownership of the bed of rivers navigable at the time of statehood
vested in the state. 117 Superior to that ownership is Congress'
commerce clause power over navigation, made pre-eminent by
the supremacy clause. 118 Ownership of land along a river is
defined by the high water mark: below that mark the state owns
111. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 53, § 101.3(A), at 16.
112. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
113. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 731 (1950).
114. Id. at 756 (separate opinion by Justice Douglas).
115. Id. at 731-42. An express example of congressional intent to compensate for the
taking of water rights is 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1982) which waives the servitude by providing
recovery in condemnation actions against lands ,above the normal high water mark for
value attributable to water dependant uses.
116. United States v. Chandler - Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913). "'Ownership of a
private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running
water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable." Id.
117. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
118. Chandler, 229 U.S. at 62.
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the land; above that mark the land is susceptible to private owner-
ship under state property law.11 9 While states may allow private
parties to appropriate the water of navigable streams and rivers
for beneficial consumptive uses,120 states cannot grant more than
they possess, and they possess only the right to make uses of the
water that are not preempted by federal uses or federally licensed
uses. 12 1 Rights that accrue to riparian land owners are likewise
subject to the pre-eminent federal power over navigable waters.
Therefore, water rights, whether appropriative or riparian, can be
asserted only against the state and private parties. Federal inter-
ference with these water rights is not a "taking," it is the assertion
of the federal government's dominant interest. Accordingly, pri-
vate parties have not received compensation for the value of
water power lost through condemnation of their land,1 22 or for
value attributable to the riparian nature of the land, 23 when the
federal government has been the actor.
It has been argued that this reasoning would support the valu-
ation of lands as desert lands which were irrigated through federal
reclamation projects and subsequently taken by the federal gov-
ernment for some use. 12 4 That is, they would be valued as lands
with no water rights and therefore no productive value. However,
such a position would have practical political limits.125  While
water rights under state law may not vest as against federal pre-
exemption, water delivery contracts signed by the controlling
agency would create valid property rights in the contract, such as
occurred in Gerlach Live Stock Co.1 26
The navigation power and servitude exist above state water
law. They are not subject to state law for their creation - that is
done by congressional act - nor are they quantified according to
state law; what the congressional navigation project needs, it gets.
119. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894Xby common law title to all lands below
high water mark was in the King and incapable of private ownership).
120. None of the water appropriation statutes in the West exempt navigable streams
and rivers from appropriation. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 229 (1971).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 109-116.
122. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956).
123. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1967).
124. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 618, n.51 (1957Xquoting
Note, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARv. L. REV. 83, 134 (1956)).
125. Corker, Federal-State Relations In Water Rights Adjudication and
Administration, RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 579, 597 (1972Xciting congressional action
which demonstrates that Congress is concerned about navigation servitude).
126. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 731 (1950XReclamation
Bureau contract to purchase claimants' water rights helped reveal that the government
plan in question was for reclamation rather than the protection of navigation).
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C. FEDERAL RECLAMATION LAW
1. Early Congressional Policy
The doctrine of prior appropriation linked to beneficial use
evolved from the experience of the Western States, and their need
to use water in their arid lands to make mining and agriculture
practical and productive. Congress opened the public domain to
homesteading in 1862,127 and to mining in 1866.128 The Mining
Act of 1866 expressly recognized and acknowledged the state law
doctrine of prior appropriation growing from the Western
experience:
[W]henever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of
water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other
purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are rec-
ognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws,
and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of
such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in
the same. 129
The Mining Act was not meant to be a grant of water rights pursu-
ant to federal law, rather Congress intended to recognize as valid
the state law growing through custom as a result of the require-
ments of the arid lands.13 0
In the Desert Land Act of 1877131 Congress sought to
encourage the settlement of arid Western lands by increasing the
acreage available for claim through homestead. One of the condi-
tions for proving a claim was the irrigation of land, requiring the
homesteader to:
[conduct] water upon the [land], within the period of
three years [after filing a declaration to do so], Provided
however that the right to the use of water by the person
so conducting the same.., shall not exceed the amount of
water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the
purpose of irrigation and reclamation: and all surplus
water over and above such actual appropriation and use,
together with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other
sources of water supply upon the public lands and not
navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropri-
127. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
128. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, 253.
129. Id. at § 9, 14 Stat. 253.
130. California v. Unites States, 438 U.S. 645, 656 (1978).
131. Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
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ation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and man-
ufacturing purposes subject to existing rights. 132
This language worked a severance of all unappropriated
waters from the land itself,133 negating any entryman's or paten-
tee's claim to common-law riparian rights,' 34 leaving water rights
for lands claimed from the public domain to be defined by the laws
of the state or territory in which it was located. 135  Congress
intended no federal water law doctrine; rather, the object was to
make it clear that each state would define these property rights.'
36
By reserving all unappropriated waters for the use of the public, as
established by the laws of the states, Congress expressly did away
with the need for Western States to recognize riparian rights.
137
Congress confused this express reservation subsequent to the
1877 Act. In a series of Acts, Congress inadvertently reserved all
lands from settlement, 138 repealed these reservations except for
possible reservoir sites,' 39 provided for rights-of-way for irrigation
canals,' 40 and then emphatically stated that the reserved reservoir
sites were reserved for use by the states.' 4' The object of this leg-
islation was to encourage states to build larger reclamation
projects than would be possible by strictly private development,
and to prevent individuals from impeding the development by
claiming necessary reservoir sites.'
14
The canal right-of-way and reservoir site statutes contained
provisions expressly preserving states' control over reclamation
within their borders. 143 It was the opinion of those who spoke on
132. Id. at ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377.
133. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158
(1935).
134. Id. at 155-56, 158.
135. Id. at 162.
136. Id. at 163-64.
137. The Colorado Supreme Court held in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443,
446-47 (1882) that the arid nature of the West gave rise to the doctrine of the right of water
by priority of appropriation, that doctrine existing from the earliest appropriations of water.
Id. at 447. The court concluded that the common-law doctrine of riparian ownership was
inapplicable to Colorado. Id. at 450. By contrast the California Supreme Court held, in Lux
v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886), that one who acquired title to riparian lands prior
to July 26, 1886, could not be deprived of his common-law rights to the flow of the stream,
absent a reservation in patent, or the effect of the July 26 Act. Id. at 782. Colorado never
recognized riparian rights, and the acts of Congress mentioned in the text, as well as the
Beaver Portland decision, deny the necessity under the federal law of recognizing that
doctrine.
138. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 527.
139. Act of Aug. 20, 1890, ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371, 391.
140. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1101 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§ 946 (1982)).
141. Act of Feb. 26, 1897, ch. 335, 29 Stat. 599.
142. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 659-61 (1918).
143. Act of Feb. 26, 1897, ch. 335, 29 Stat. 599.
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the bill, that the states possessed this control, and that the reserva-
tion was inserted out of caution, Congress intending no disruption
of state control. 144 So, in its early reclamation schemes enabling
private and state development of irrigation projects, Congress
consistently chose to allow states to devise rules for the distribu-
tion of water, a federal property, rather than exercise that respon-
sibility itself.
2. Reclamation Act of 1902
At the start of this century it appeared that private and state
reclamation efforts were reaching the limits of their abilities. 145 If
further reclamation was to be accomplished the resources of the
nation would have to be thrown behind the effort. The goal of
massive reclamation of Western lands was a bi-partisan one,
wholly supported by President Theodore Roosevelt.' 46 The Recla-
mation Act of 1902 provided for building projects on federal land,
with the construction and operation of the projects done under
the authority of the Secretary of the Interior. 4 7 Water rights from
federal reclamation projects were required to be appurtenant to
[T]he right of way through the public lands and reservations of the United States
is hereby granted . . . for the purpose of irrigation . .. to the extent of the
ground occupied by the water of the reservoir and of the canal and its laterals
.. : Provided, That .. . the privilege herein granted shall not be construed to
interfere with the control of the water for irrigation and other purposes under
authority of the respective States or Territories.
26 Stat. at 1101-02, supra note 140.
[A]lI reservoir sites reserved or to be reserved shall be open to use and occu-
pation under the right-of-way Act of March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-
one. And any State is hereby authorized to improve and occupy such reservoir
sites to the same extent as an individual or private corporation, under such rules
and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe: Provided, That
the charges for water coming in whole or part from reservoir sites used or occu-
pied under the provisions of this Act shall always be subject to the control and
regulation of the respective States and Territories in which such reservoirs are in
whole or part situate.
29 Stat. at 599.
144. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978). Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, quoted Representative Lacey, Chairman of the House Committee on Public
Lands, as saying that the water:
does not belong to the [Federal] Government. The reservoirs in which the
water is stored belong to the Government, but the water belongs to the States
and will be controlled by them. The amendment proposed by the gentleman
from Illinois [Mr. Cannon] relieves this measure from all possible doubt upon
that subject. I think there could be no doubt anyhow, but this amendment takes
away the possibility of any question being raised as to the right of the States and
Territories to regulate and control the management and the price of the water.
Id. at 662 (citing 29 CONG. REC. 1952 (1897)).
145. See R. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATER 36-58 (1983Xchapter
four: "Construction by States;" chapter five: "National Reclamation").
146. Id. at 50-51.
147. Id. at 51.
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the land irrigated, limited to 160 acre tracts, and beneficial use was
established as the "basis, the measure, and the limit of the
right."a1 4
Section 8 of the Act provided that the Act would not displace
state or territorial water law, but would be operated in conformity
with such law.149 State law was expected to control the appropria-
tion of water for the project and distribution once released from
the project.' 50
Under the Act the Secretary of the Interior is required to
determine the feasibility of projects, both in the sense of physical
possibility and the availability of water.' 5 ' If feasible, an appropria-
tion of water for the project is to be made by "giving the notice
and complying with the forms of law of the State or Territory in
which the works [are] located."'1 2 The Secretary of the Interior
could stand in the place of an individual in the State and could do
nothing in appropriating water "which could not be undertaken
by an individual or corporation if it were in the position of the
Government as regards the ownership of its lands.' 1 53 During the
debate there was some concern that the bill would allow condem-
nation of water rights. Representative Mondell, principal sponsor
of the bill in the House, responded that condemnation power
would be conferred only by state law, not the bill, and that "[t]he
bill provides explicitly that even an appropriation of water can not
be made except under state law."1 54
State law was meant to control the distribution of water
released from the federal reservoir as well. Section 8 was
intended to insure that "the control of waters after leaving the res-
ervoirs shall be vested in the States and Territories through which
such waters flow."' 5 5 Congress intended to defer to the expertise
of the state water administrators, who had the experience to tailor
administration to local water users with differing needs. Congress
also wanted to avoid the confusion that would be caused by federal
water law and state water law operating side by side in the same
148. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372,
383 (1982)).
149. Id. For the text of section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, see supra note 47.
150. California v. United States, 438 U.S. at 665-68.
151. Reclamation Act of 1902, supra note 148 at 32 Stat. 390.
152. 35 CONG. REC. 6678 (1902Xstatement of Rep. Mondell, principal sponsor of bill in
House).
153. H.R. REP. No. 794, 57th Cong. 1st Sess. 7-8 (1902).
154. 35 CONG. REC. 6687 (1902).
155. 35 CONG. REC. 2222 (1902Xexplanation by Senator Clark, major supporter of the
reclamation bill).
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locality. 156
These reclamation laws can be seen as establishing congres-
sional policies in favor of beneficial consumptive use of water in
the arid West, and for state control of the mechanisms for the
acquiring and quantification of these water rights.
III. THE FLOOD CONTROL ACT OF 1944 AND THE
O'MAHONEY-MILLIKEN AMENDMENT
A. THE ACT: TEXT AND HISTORY
In 1944 Congress began looking to the post-war period by
planning massive projects, both to remedy the backlog of works
put aside for the war effort, and to occupy the soon to be demobil-
ized servicemen. 157 Among the projects started in that session
were a system of federally constructed waterways authorized by
The Rivers and Harbors Omnibus Bill,15 8 and nationwide flood
control measures pursuant to The Flood Control Bill. 15 9 Western
states were concerned with the possible impacts these two
projects would have on water use and water law within the arid
region of the United States. 160
1. Rivers and Harbors - House
The Rivers and Harbors Bill was originally reported to the
House without any provision specifically dealing with Western
water. 16 1 Concern over the impact of the bill's projects on West-
ern water rights and administration led the Committee to hold
hearings on possible amendments to the Missouri River provisions
of the Bill.' These hearings coincided with the 1944 hearing
156. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 668-69 (1978).
157. 90 CONG. REC. 8669 (1944).
158. H.R. REP., No. 3961, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944XRivers and Harbors).
159. H.R. REP. No. 4485, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944XFlood Control).
160. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Omnibus Bill: Hearings on H.R. 3961 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 795-96 (1944)
[hereinafter Hearings on Rivers and Harbors Omnibus Bill](statement by Hon. C.A.
Bottolfsen, Governor of IdahoXconflict was certain to arise if present consumptive priorities
in Idaho were not considered).
161. See H.R. REP. No. 100, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprinted in I. HOUSE MIsc. REP.
(H.R. Rep. No. 100X1944). The original report from the House Committee on Rivers and
Harbors did not provide for consumptive use of the Missouri River by Eastern states. Id.
The report mainly discussed a nine foot channel which would increase navigation. Id.
162. Missouri River Basin: Hearings on Amendments to the Missouri River Provision
in H.R. 3961 Before the House Comm. on Rivers and Harbors, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944)
[hereinafter House Rivers and Harbors Hearing]. The Rivers and Harbors Bill was reported
to the House of Representatives on January 19, 1944. Id. The House Committee on Rivers
and Harbors held a hearing to amend H.R. 3961 on February 18 and 22, 1944. Id. at I. At
this hearing, various governors and persons representing such states as Montana, Wyoming,
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before the House Committee on Flood Control.' 63 Appearances
were made by Upper Missouri River Basin governors and con-
gressmen, as well as Commissioner Harry Bashore of the Bureau of
Reclamation and L.C. Bishop, State Engineer of Wyoming.164
Commissioner Bashore's testimony at the House Rivers and
Harbors Hearings involved the requirements of the then author-
ized 6 feet deep, 200 feet wide, Missouri River Channel and the
proposed 9 feet by 300 feet channel." 5 He concluded that full
development of the 6 foot channel would allow the development
for irrigation of additional 2,778,000 acres over what had been irri-
gated in the past, and that the 9 foot channel would allow no irri-
gation development. 6 6 Mr. Bishop proposed an amendment that
would establish consumptive uses as the dominant use, and limit
any federal development to exercises of federal power or right
that would not interfere with beneficial consumptive uses.' 67
Representative Case of South Dakota spoke of the need to
establish a priority for consumptive use in the Upper Basin.'68  He
suggested as a minimum protection a proviso to the Missouri River
Basin portion of the bill, "Provided, that such improvements when
accomplished shall not create or place any additional demands
upon the water resources of the Missouri River Basin over that
authorized by existing law."' 6 9 In the absence of this minimum
protection, Case suggested the Appropriation Committee could
provide for a retrenchment of the appropriations bill, and block
any development on the Missouri River.' 70 When the committee
and North Dakota requested an effort be made to amend H.R. 3961 'to protect the rights of
Upper Missouri Basin States to use the stream's flow for consumptive uses. Id. at 3.
163. The House Committee on Rivers and Harbors hearing on proposed amendments
to H.R. 3961 was held on February 18 and 22, 1944. Id. at I. The hearings before the
House Committee on Flood Control were held from February 1 to 23, 1944. Id. at I.
164. Id. at 24, 30.
165. Id. at 32 (statement of Harry W. Bashore, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation,
United States Dept. of Interior).
166. Id. at 34.
167. Id. at 26 (statement of L.C. Bishop, state engineer). Mr. Bishop's proposed
amendment provided:
The United States, or those acting by or under its authority in the exercise of
rights or powers arising from whatever jurisdiction the United States has in,
over, and to the waters of the basin shall recognize, to the extent consistent with
the best utilization of the waters for multiple purposes, that beneficial
consumptive use of the waters within the basin is of paramount importance to
the development of the basin; and no exercise of such power or right thereby
that would interfere with the full beneficial consumptive use of the waters
within the basin shall be made.
Id.
168. Id. at 45.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 46.
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reported back to the House, it proposed the Case language as a
committee amendment. 17 1
A version granting a dominant position to beneficial consump-
tive uses and subordinating navigation to those uses was offered as
a substitute amendment by Representative Barrett of Wyo-
ming.'72 In arguing for his amendment, Barrett pointed to the
constitutional dominance of navigation and the all consuming
demand of the 9 foot channel.173 Representative Case spoke in
favor of the Barrett Amendment, preferring affirmative recogni-
tion of upstream uses to his own language, in the committee
amendment, which represented only the "irreducible minimum of
what should be adopted.' 1 74  The Barrett Amendment was
rejected and the committee amendment adopted. 75
Another amendment was offered by Representative Robinson
of Utah. His amendment stated that navigational uses west of the
97th meridian would be subordinate to, and not interfere with,
beneficial consumptive uses established under state law.' 76 The
inadequacy of the committee (or Case) amendment from the per-
spective of Western interests was reiterated.177 The committee
amendment attempted to "freeze" the water rights "subject to
existing law," and under that law navigation had a pre-eminent
place, not limited by state adjudication of water rights. 178 In addi-
tion, the committee amendment was limited to the Missouri River,
while the Rivers and Harbors Bill concerned projects nation-
wide.' 79  The Robinson Amendment failed.' 80  Representative
Barrett made one last attempt, this time to strike out all reference
to the Missouri River from the committee amendment in light of
the fact that the Bureau of Reclamation's report on the Missouri
River was due within 60 days.18 ' This too was rejected. 182 The Bill
171. 90 CONG. REC. 2835 (1944).
172. Id. Representative Barrett's proposed amendment read:
Provided, That the use of waters of the Missouri River and its tributaries for
municipal, domestic, or livestock water supply, for irrigation of arid or semiarid
lands, and for mining and industrial purposes shall not be adversely affected
thereby and that any use of such Waters for the maintenance of a navigable
channel shall be subordinate to and shall not interfere with any of the aforesaid
uses heretofore or hereafter established.
Id. at 2836.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2840, see also House Rivers and Harbors Hearings supra note 162, at 45.
175. 90 CONG. REC. 2846 (1944).
176. Id. at 2856.
177. Id. at 2856-57.
178. Id. at 2857.
179. See text, supra at note 169.




approved by the House contained an authorization for the 9 foot
channel, and the Case Amendment limiting water rights to those
of existing law. 183
2. Flood Control - House
The testimonial support for Upper Basin protection before the
House Committee on Flood Control was mixed. Governor Sharpe
of South Dakota advocated language to the effect that no use
would gain a vested right - neither navigation nor irrigation -
but would remain subject to Congressional reallocation at any-
time.'8 4 Colonel Reber, former division engineer of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers in the Missouri River Division,
stated the Army's position: no more water would be required for
the 9 foot channel, and the mere building of the proposed flood
control reservoirs would not establish a preference for
navigation. 185
Commissioner Bashore (Bureau of Reclamation) advocated
the inclusion of a protective proviso in the bill, making it clear
"that the construction and operation of the authorized works
[would] not.., curtail beneficial consumptive uses of the waters of
the Missouri River and its tributaries.' 86 When the bill was
reported to the House it contained as a committee amendment
the proviso that uses below Sioux City, Iowa, would not make
demands on the waters above Sioux City beyond that authorized
by existing law.' The Western interests were not satisfied, how-
ever, and in heated debate an amendment subordinating naviga-
tion to consumptive uses was offered and rejected. 88
Representative Lemke of North Dakota, author of the West-
ern States' Preference Amendment, stated that the Committee on
182. Id. at 2920.
183. Id. at 2836.
184. Flood-Control Plans and New Projects: Hearings on H.R. 4485 Before the House
Comm. on Flood Control, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 951 (1944) [hereinafter Housing Flood
Control Hearings].
185. Id. at 1062, 1064.
186. Id. at 970.
187. 90 CONc. REC. 4119 (1944). The amendment was first quoted by Rep. Mundt of
South Dakota. Id. Reference was also made to the amendment during the remarks of Rep.
Whittington, Chair House Committee on Flood Control. Id. at 4123-24.
188. Id. at 4212. The Lemke preference amendment read:
Provided, That the use for navigation and related purposes, in connection with
this expanded general comprehensive plan, of those waters of the Missouri River
which arise west of the ninety-seventh meridian shall be subordinate to and shall
not adversely affect at any time the beneficial consumptive use, west of the
ninety-seventh meridian, of such waters for domestic, municipal, irrigation,
P mining, or industrial purposes.
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Flood Control and the Committee on Rivers and Harbors had not
respected the rights of the Upper Basin States in their actions and
warned:
I may say that this battle has just begun. This is just a
skirmish. We are going to win because justice will prevail
in the end. We are not going to take the water from the
people in the states where it originated so that some fel-
low can float a yacht down the lower Mississippi Valley,
while the people and their cattle in the upper regions go
hungry on account of the lack of food and water.18 9
An equally impassioned speech was delivered by Representa-
tive Dirksen of Illinois, when he argued the fundamental justice of
putting domestic, municipal, mining, and industrial uses ahead of
navigation. "What difference does it make," he said, "if you have a
sufficient channel to float a battleship, if the produce of the soil and
the contents of factories and the livelihood and self-preservation
that are involved here are not first given preference?"'1 90 The pas-
sion failed to sway a sufficient number of congressmen, and the
amendment was defeated 52 to 59.191
3. Flood Control - Senate
In the Senate, all of the debate on an amendment giving pref-
erence to consumptive uses occurred in committee hearings and
away from the floor. By the time the O'Mahoney version of a pref-
erence amendment was presented on the floor the battle was
over. 192
In the committee hearings, the debate was between those
who favored the limited proviso of the House version' 93 and those
favoring stronger, states' rights language.' 94 Governor Sharpe was
an anomaly, advocating an express intent not to fix any rights, and
leaving the establishment of relative rights to future Congresses to
resolve as actual conflicts arose.' 9 5 The parade of witnesses estab-
189. Id. at 4213.
190. Id. at 4215.
191. Id. at 4218.
192. See id. at 8547 (little debate arose on the floor when the amendment concerning
the Missouri River was read). For the text of the O'Mahoney Preference Amendment, see
infra note 202, and accompanying text.
193. For the relevant part of the limited proviso of the House version of the preference
amendment, see supra note 169, and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion on the favoring of stronger state rights language in the House
version of the preference amendments, see supra notes 172, 188, and accompanying text.
195. Flood Control: Hearings on H.R. 4485 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.




lished one certainty: though there may have been doubt about the
language to use, the West wanted assurances that consumptive use
would be protected, and Interior Secretary Ickes and President
Roosevelt supported their position. 196 Given the relative strength
a Western block would have in the Senate, along with certain East-
ern malcontents who would be sympathetic to their position, there
was probably a consensus in the Senate Subcommittee that the
West's concerns should be met through negotiations to avoid a
floor fight.
Some sparks were struck on the floor, suggesting the tone if a
floor fight had been made. First, Senator Wheeler of Montana
warned:
When we come to the question of what is most important
for the masses of the people in this country, whether it be
to allow a little more water to go down the Missouri River
for the Standard Oil Co. and a few other big companies
which operate and put the money in their pockets, or to
furnish homes for the soldiers who will come back and
need homes to live in, I shall want to discuss the problem
at length on the floor of the Senate.197
Senator Wheeler's statement provoked Senator Clark of Missouri
to reply as follows:
[I]n view of what the Senator from Montana has said
about the character of the pending bill, I wish to call
attention to the fact that the bill originally started as a
strictly flood-control measure, and that the whole ques-
tion of irrigation and reclamation was injected into the
measure entirely improperly and irrelevantly, in my opin-
ion, by an amendment introduced by the Senator from
Wyoming [Mr. O'Mahoney], joined in by numerous Sena-
tors from other irrigation states. They undertook to estab-
lish an absolute priority in futurity, not only as to the use
of water for existing irrigation projects, but in all futurity
for any project which they might devise ... 19
The next mention of the matter on the Senate floor came
196. See 90 CONG. REC. 8545-8546 (1944XIetter from Secretary of the Interior Harold
L. IckesXletter proposed an amendment providing for the storage of water for irrigation);
Id. at 8623 (letter from President Franklin D. RooseveltXevery flood control project in the
West should take into consideration the conservation of water for beneficial use).
197. Id. at 8253.
198. Id. For the text of the O'Mahoney Preference Amendment, see infra note 202
and accompanying text.
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when Senator Overton, chair of the Senate Subcommittee, stated
that certain committee amendments and other provisions of the
bill had been the subject of considerable discussions between the
committee and proponents of the "so-called O'Mahoney Amend-
ment. '"199 Until the controversy was resolved, he suggested the
matter be passed over.2 °0
When the preference provision, along with the other contro-
versial parts dealt with by the O'Mahoney Amendment, finally
reached the floor, Senator Overton allowed Senator O'Mahoney to
make the presentation.20 ' In its final form the preference amend-
ment read:
The use for navigation, in connection with the operation
and maintenance of such works herein authorized for
construction, of waters arising in states lying wholly or
partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian shall be only
such use as does not conflict with any beneficial consump-
tive use, present or future, in states lying wholly or partly
west of the ninety-eighth meridian, of such waters for
domestic, municipal, stock water, irrigation, mining, or
industrial purposes.20 2
After a few questions the amendment was agreed to.20 3
4. Rivers and Harbors - Senate
The Rivers and Harbors Bill reached the Senate after the
Flood Control Bill had been acted upon.20 4 Senator Overton again
allowed Senator O'Mahoney to present the amendments, stating
that:
[i]nasmuch as there is no controversy about them, inas-
much as they have been agreed upon after long, careful,
prayerful, and thorough consideration and study, and
inasmuch as they were presented before this body upon
the consideration of the flood-control bill, I think it would
be well to adopt them now .... 2
The Senate adopted the amendments without debate as did the
199. 90 CONG. REC. 8419 (1944).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 8485.
202. Id. at 8546.
203. Id. at 8548.
204. The Rivers and Harbors Bill H.R. 3961, was passed as amended in the Senate on
December 12, 1944. Id. at 9247. The Flood Control Bill, H.R. 4485, was passed as amended
in the Senate on December 1, 1944. Id. at 8668.




B. SIGNIFICANCE OF O'MAHONEY-MILLIKEN AMENDMENT
Before the possible interpretations of the O'Mahoney-Milliken
preference provision2 0 7 are discussed, it is useful to make some
general comments on the significance of the legislative history.
First of all, whatever the effect given to the preference provi-
sion, it is applicable to all of the West, not just the Missouri River
Basin.20 8 The original House versions of the preference provision,
in both the Flood Control and Rivers and Harbors Bills, expressly
dealt with the Missouri River Basin. The Robinson Amendment to
the Rivers and Harbors Bill was the first introduction of language
setting the geographic boundary in terms of the ninety-seventh
meridian. The comments accompanying that amendment, those
made in the Senate hearings, and the general comments made on
the House and Senate floors, all show that the concern over the
conflict between navigation and beneficial consumptive use was
felt throughout the West. The sponsorship of the Senate Rivers
and Harbors Amendment lends additional weight to this
proposition.2 °9
It is also clear, though the final version may not have been the
"happy words" that expressed the intent without ambiguity,
whatever effect is finally given is not to be taken lightly. The
amendment was very deliberately added to both bills, with sub-
stantial debate in the House, considerable attention paid in the
hearings (including the unusual reconvening of the House Rivers
and Harbors hearing after the bill had been reported out of the
committee), with comments from the Army, Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Interior Secretary Ickes, and President Roosevelt.210 Of the
versions suggested, the final version adopted strong language and
206. Id. at 8673 (Senate), 9485 (House agreeing to conference report).
207. For the text of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Preference Amendment, see supra note
202 and accompanying text.
208. 90 CONG. REC. 8546 (1944Xamendment applied to all waters arising west of the
98th meridian).
209. The sponsors were Senator O'Mahoney (Wyoming), Austin (Vermont), Bushfield
(South Dakota), Chavez (New Mexico), Clark (Idaho), Downey (California), Hatch (New
Mexico), Hayden (Arizona), Johnson (Colorado), Langer (North Dakota), McCarran
(Nevada), McFarland (Arizona), Milliken (Colorado), Murdock (Utah), Murray (Montana),
Nye (North Dakota), Robertson (Wyoming), Scrugham (Nevada), Thomas (Utah), Thomas
(Idaho), Wheeler (Montana), and Wilson (Iowa). Id. at 8672.
210. See Hearings on Rivers and Harbors Omnibus Bill, supra note 160, at 17
(statement by Maj. Gen. Eugene Reybold, Chief of Engineers, United States Army). House
Rivers and Harbors Hearing, supra note 162, at 51 (statement by J.K. Cheadle, Chief
Counsel, Bureau of Reclamation); 90 CONG. REC. 8545-46 (1944Xletter from Secretary of
Interior Harold L. Ickes); Id. at 8623 (letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
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was probably meant to do more than the original "freezing" of
rights.2 11
The intent was to create a preference for beneficial consump-
tive uses of water over navigational uses. That was what was
called for before the committees, and on the floor, and what the
original committee amendments were said not to do. Representa-
tive Dirksen's soliloquy is a clear expression of the reprioritization
sought to be achieved by the amendment.21 2
Moreover, the amendment was aimed at the navigation
power and servitude. In the hearings and on the floor express ref-
erence was made to Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co.,21 3 United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co. (the New River Case),214 and
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.215 Discussion also
involved the power of Congress to reverse the dominant position
of the navigation 5ower, with opponents of the amendment ques-
tioning its constitutionality.21 What the Western interests sought
to do with the preference provisions was alter that dominant
position.
C. POSSIBLE READINGS
A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that only
statutes of doubtful meaning are subjected to statutory interpreta-
tion. 7 When applied to specific factual situations there must be
some doubt as to the result mandated by the statute. In the con-
text of water use the first fact to be assumed to find the necessary
conflict is that there is insufficient water available for all uses, i.e.,
there must be a time of shortage. This can come about through a
decline in the water supply, a drought, or an increase in the level
of use. The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment speaks of beneficial
consumptive use and navigation use of water arising in states lying
wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian. 2 8 The possi-
211. Compare the language at supra note 169 (freeze) to that at supra note 202
(preference).
212. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
213. 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941Xdiscussing Congress' broad power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the navigability of the Red River).
214. 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940Xauthority of Congress over navigable waters is broad and
not limited to control for navigation purposes only).
215. 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899Xstates cannot destroy the power of Congress to secure the
uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams).
216. For discussions concerning the constitutionality of reversing Congress' navigation
power, see 90 CONG. REC. 2836 (1944).
217. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.02 (Sands 4th ed.
1984).
218. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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ble configuration of conflict between these two uses (assuming
"pre-existing" means a use existing prior to the enactment of the
1944 and 1945 Acts, and "subsequent" means a use arising subse-
quent to those enactments) are as follows:
1. A pre-existing beneficial consumptive use conflicts
with a pre-existing navigational use.
2. A pre-existing beneficial consumptive use conflicts
with a subsequent navigational use.
3. A subsequent beneficial consumptive use conflicts
with a pre-existing navigational use.
4. A subsequent beneficial consumptive use conflicts
with a subsequent navigational use and (a) the benefi-
cial consumptive use began before the navigational
use, or (b) the beneficial consumptive use began after
the navigational use.
The issue then, is which combination of these uses falls within the
operation of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, and how the
amendment resolves the conflict.
1. Narrow Constructions
The narrowest possible application of the O'Mahoney-Milli-
ken Amendment is no application, that is, a court hostile to the
reversal of the constitutionally pre-eminent position of navigation
could "read the provision out." Such was the fate of section 8 of
the Reclamation Act of 1902, which established a Congressional
policy of deferring to state water law for the establishment and
quantification of water rights in federal reclamation projects, in
Arizona v. California.19 In that case the Supreme Court held that
section 8 did not subject the Secretary of the Interior to state law
in disposing water from the Boulder Canyon Project.22° This was
done as an extension of the previous ruling that an express regula-
tion of Congress (limiting permitted acreage in a federal reclama-
tion project to 160 acres) need not give way to an inconsistent
state system.221 If the preference amendment were given this
treatment, navigation rights would be dominant over consumptive
water rights in all cases. However, the Supreme Court has dis-
avowed the Arizona v. California position to the extent it would
prevent states from imposing conditions on water permits granted
219. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). For the text of Section 8, see supra note 47.
220. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (1963).
221. Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 293 (1958).
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to the United States which are not inconsistent with the act
authorizing the project involved.222 It is probable that the
Supreme Court would similarly find that the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendment does have some effect on the navigation power, and
that the amendment cannot be disregarded altogether.2 3
Another restrictive reading might argue that the phrase "in
connection with the operation and maintenance of such works
herein authorized for construction" means that the provision is an
interagency instruction for operations to the Corps of Engineers
and the Bureau of Reclamation and that it is not meant to have
effect between states. 24 But such a reading could be supported
only if all resort to legislative history were prevented. The ill
sought to be remedied was the navigation in the Lower Basin
States of water better used consumptively in the Upper Basin.
Even if such an interpretation could be found in the "plain mean-
ing" of the statute, it would not be supportable as contrary to legis-
lative intent.225
Likewise a literal reading might argue that the amendment is
inapplicable to Iowa or Missouri, neither of which lie wholly or
partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian, and that the amend-
ment is meant to apply to conflicts between the uses in the arid
states.2 However, the amendment states that the navigational
use of water which arises in the arid states will not be that which
conflicts with the use of that water beneficially in the arid states. 2 7
The qualifying language, "west of the ninety-eighth meridian,"
modifies the place where the projected waters arise and where
their beneficial consumptive use is to be protected. The geo-
graphic qualifier does not apply to the place where the naviga-
tional use is restricted. Legislative history supports this reading. 2
A stronger argument is that Congress intended to "freeze"
the relative rights of beneficial consumptive use and navigational
use in the West. In an exchange between Senator Murry of Mon-
tana and Senator O'Mahoney, Murray asked whether the changes
222. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978).
223. Justice Rehnquist quoted from the preamble of the 1944 Flood Control Act in
finding that Congress consistently reaffirmed the need for the Secretary of the Interior to
follow state law in all respects not directly inconsistent with the enabling acts. Id. at 678.
224. See supra note 14.
225. FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
226. See supra note 1 for a listing of states within the Missouri River Basin.
227. For the text of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Preference Amendment, see supra note
202.
228. 90 CoNG. REc. 4213 (1944). Representative Lemke (North Dakota) stated: "We
are not going to take the water from the people in the states where it originated so that
some fellow may float a yacht down the lower Mississippi Valley... " Id.
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made during the off-the-floor negotiations would 'require him to
contact his constituents who had telegraphed their support for the
amendment in a previous form. O'Mahoney replied:
No; I am sure that no changes will be made which will
make it necessary for the Senator from Montana to make
contact with those persons, because they are interested
• . . in maintaining the rights of individuals to use the
water that arises within these states. That is the objective
of the amendment, it has been its objective from the very
beginning ... 229
The committee version, which made reference to "existing
law" had been said to freeze the rights of navigation at the time of
enactment.23 ° It was noted that the navigation power was supe-
rior to state-granted rights under existing law.23' The language of
the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment might be a mere prospec-
tive negation of the navigation power, and no allocation between
uses. Such a reading could find vested rights in navigation at the
level existing in 1944.232 If that were the case, pre-existing or sub-
sequent consumptive uses which conflict with pre-existing naviga-
tional uses would be servient. A subsequent navigational use
would have to give way to a pre-existing or subsequent consump-
tive use, however. The problem with this interpretation is that
navigation is not asserted as a "vested" right. Navigational use is
the product of the supremacy of federal law, and cannot be
asserted by an individual or state.233 If Congress intended to pre-
serve a certain level of navigational use it should have identified
that level expressly. Instead, it chose language placing consump-
tive uses ahead of navigation.
2. Broader Reading
The advocates of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment spoke
of the provision in terms of a preference' for beneficial consump-
tive uses over navigation. Arguably they intended the amend-
ments to reverse the traditional position of navigation and
consumptive uses and establish a priority for beneficial consump-
tive uses. The amendment speaks of protecting present or future
beneficial consumptive uses, indicating that the navigation power
229. 90 CONG. REC. 8420 (1944).
230. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232. See House Rivers and Harbors Hearings, supra note 162 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 88-126 and accompanying text.
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is not to be evoked against present or future beneficial consump-
tive uses.234
In terms of defining the evil sought to be remedied, the West-
ern interests were afraid that the navigation power might prevent
the development of additional irrigated acreage.
Testimony before various committees called for assurances
that navigation would not interfere with future plans for reclama-
tion: the Governors' statement asked for this;235 L.C. Bishop asked
that sufficient water be allocated to the Upper Basin "to care for all
the irrigation that can benefit therefrom;- 236 Commissioner
Bashore spoke of the possibility that navigation development
could stifle future reclamation, 237 and specifically concluded that
the nine foot channel would preclude any additional irrigation
development in the Upper Basin;238 and the reclamation portion
of the flood control bill was touted as adding the equivalent of a
new state, clearly indicating that substantial development was
planned. 39
On the floor of the House and Senate, while debating both the
Flood Control and Rivers and Harbors bills, the proponents of a
preference provision noted the possible restrictive effect naviga-
tion could have on future development, and they brought it up
over, and over, and over again until the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendment was adopted to reassure them. Under the broadest
reading,'pre-existing and subsequent consumptive uses would be
given a priority, and water held in the federal impounds would be
put to consumptive uses in a time of scarcity, even if navigation
suffered.
D. A NOTE ON A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
During the debate on the Flood Control bill in the House, it
was argued that an amendment negating the dominant navigation
servitude or granting a preference to beneficial consumptive uses
would be unconstitutional.24 ° It was said that dominance was cre-
234. For the text of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Preference Amendment, see supra note
202 and accompanying text.
235. House Rivers and Harbors Hearings, supra note 162, at 34; House Flood Control
Hearings, supra note 184, at 975; Senate Flood Control Hearings, supra note 195 at 541.
236. House Rivers and Harbors Hearings, supra note 162 at 25.
237. Id. at 33; House Flood Control Hearings, supra note 184 at 960.
238. House Rivers and Harbors Hearings, supra note 162 at 35; House Flood Control
Hearing, supra note 184, at 969. Commissioner Bashore suggested locks and a still water
navigation system as a method to accommodate both uses. Id.
239. House Flood Control Hearings, supra note 184, at 975.
240. 90 CONG. REC. 2836 (1944).
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ated by the United States Constitution, and could not be done
away with by an act of Congress.24 1 Is it possible for Congress to
build a project with navigation components without vesting water
rights sufficient to support the level of use contemplated in the
plan? It appears that a majority of the 78th Congress believed
they could, and that the Supreme Court would agree.242
In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress did not elect to use its navigation servi-
tude to acquire state water rights in the Central Valley Project in
California. 243 Even though navigation components were involved
in the project, the Court held that Friant Dam was a reclamation
dam built under the general welfare or spending clause, and that
Congress did not intend to invoke the navigation servitude to
avoid a taking of water rights.2 44 The Court found this, Congres-
sional intent in the fact that the project was conceived and author-
ized by the President as a reclamation project, was presented to
Congress as a reclamation project, and had been operated by the
Bureau of Reclamation as a reclamation project.245
The Missouri River projects were conceived as multi-use plans
including flood control and navigation projects (Pick plan) and rec-
lamation projects (Sloan plan).2 6 The plan adopted by Congress
attempted to reconcile the two plans into one multi-purpose
plan. 24 ' The Supreme Court recently affirmed the Eighth Cir-
cuit's ruling that the dominant purpose of the Oahe Dam and res-
ervoir was flood control, because the Corps of Engineers built the
dam, operated it as a flood control dam, and the Bureau of Recla-
mation never used the dam for irrigation. 48
The Upstream States will certainly argue that in any future
litigation over Missouri River water the O'Mahoney-Milliken
Amendment 249 was an election by Congress not to invoke the
dominance of navigation. Should that fail, the Upstream States
241. Id.
242. See id. at 2916 (amendment providing domestic and irrigation priority over
navigation defeated).
243. 339 U.S. 725, 739 (1949).
244. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742 (1950). If the servitude
were invoked there would be no "taking," merely a use of the dominant estate to the
detriment of the servient estate.
245. Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 739-42.
246. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805, 808-09 (1988).
247. Id.; Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 9(a), 58 Stat. 891 (Pick-Sloan
Plan).
248. E7SI Pipeline Project, 108 S. Ct. at 808 (affirming Eighth Circuit decision in
Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1986).
249. For the text of the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, see supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
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would argue that the project has as its dominant purpose flood
control, and that it was built under the spending power. Such an
election was recognized in Gerlach.25 ° If Congress has the power
to employ all means not prohibited by the Constitution, and
rationally related to ends within the compass of constitutionally
enumerated powers,25' it can logically choose not to employ a
means within its power to use. While the use of the navigation
power gives rise to the navigation servitude's rule of non-compen-
sation, Congress' choice to proceed under the spending power
should give no occasion to use that servitude. Similarly, a congres-
sional declaration that navigation is not the dominant purpose of a
project, rather is the least important purpose, should properly rel-
egate navigation to the lowest priority of use.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Upper Basin States, lead by South Dakota, can find a valu-
able weapon in the battle over Missouri River water in the
O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment. Congress, in the amendments
to the Flood Control Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act, recog-
nized the states's authority to apportion water rights within their
borders, and declared that state apportionments would not be dis-
turbed by the assertion of the federal navigation power under the
commerce clause. The broad geographic language of the amend-
ment makes this weapon available to all Western reclamation
interests should a conflict arise between consumptive uses and
navigation.
250. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 731 (1950).
251. McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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